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THE YAMASEE WAR: 1715 - 1717
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The Yamasee Indians
Chester B. DePratter Ph.D.
South Carolina Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology
University of South Carolina
The Yamasee settled on the South Carolina coast in 1683 following their flight
from the Spanish coastal Georgia Guale missions. The newly arrived Yamasee
first settled on the islands around Port Royal Sound including St. Helena, Parris,
and Hilton Head Islands. In 1686, the Spaniards attacked and destroyed both the
Yamasee towns and Stuart’s Town, a nearby settlement of Scots. The Yamasee
relocated their settlements closer to Charles Town on the banks of the Ashepoo
and Combahee Rivers. They returned to the area around Port Royal Sound in the
1690s. A 1707 Act established the Yamasee lands on the mainland in the upper
part of Port Royal.
Within this Yamasee territory, the Yamasee were settled in two distinct
clusters. The Upper Yamasee towns, Pocotaligo, Pocosabo, Huspah, Tomatley,
and Tulafina, were occupied primarily by Guale who had been part of the
Spanish mission system on the Georgia coast. The Lower Yamasee towns
included Altamaha, Ocute or Okatee, Ichisi or Chechessee, and the Euhaw.
These Lower Towns were formerly residents of interior Georgia (the Spanish
province of La Tama) who had sought refuge among the Guale missions
following devastating slave raids by the Westo. Many of the Yamasee towns
have been excavated by archaeologists.

The Yamasee War
Jon Bernard Marcoux
Noreen Stonor Drexel Cultural and Historic Preservation Program
Salve Regina University
Introduction
On Good Friday, April 15, 1715, the chaos of war invaded the lives of the
European colonists, enslaved Africans, and Native Americans living in South
Carolina. The Yamasee War began that day when a number of trade officials
were murdered in the Yamasee town of Pocotaligo. The murders took South
Carolinians completely by surprise, as the Yamasee were thought to be one of
the colony's closest Indian allies. Indeed, the murdered Englishmen had only
been sent to Pocotaligo in order to arrange talks with another Indian group, the
Ochese Muskogeans (later Creeks), who were rumored to be planning attacks
against South Carolina traders and
settlers. These initial murders were
quickly followed by major Yamasee
attacks on plantations around Port
Royal, near modern day Beaufort,
SC. In these attacks, the Yamasee
managed to kill over 100 colonists
and set the rest of the settlement's
population to flight. In the following
weeks, news began to filter into
Charleston that the English traders
in virtually every southeastern
Indian village had either been killed
or chased off. Adding to the fears of
a pan-Indian assault, news emerged that the Catawba and a small group of
Cherokee had made raids on plantations north of Charleston and even managed
to capture a South Carolina militia garrison. Facing this apparent "invasion,"
colonists across South Carolina fled to Charleston, where the effects of
overcrowding, fear, and tension, exacerbated by the summer heat, took its toll
on the physical and mental health of many residents (Crane 2004; Oatis 2004).
Historians and archaeologists have been studying this conflict for over two
centuries, yet most of the public is only vaguely aware of the Yamasee War or its
significance outside of South Carolina. Indeed, historian William Ramsey (2008)
states that the Yamasee War (1715-1717) “easily ranks with King Philip’s War and
Pontiac’s Rebellion” as a key colonial conflict; however, compared to these other
wars, it remains woefully understudied. As we recognize the 300-year
anniversary of the conflict, there has been an upsurge in scholarly interest in the
Yamasee War. The results of these new projects will doubtless provide new
insights for understanding this pivotal moment of the colonial period.
The Battles and Major Events of the War
The Yamassee War included a small number of what might be called major
military engagements, and these were confined to the first three months of the
war. Afterward, hostilities were limited to Yamasee and Muskogean raids on
trading caravans and frontier skirmishes with South Carolina militia that
continued sporadically for the next two years. Peace with the last of the hostile
groups, the Lower Creeks, officially ended the war in 1717. While rare, the major
battles described below were nevertheless significant, for they included
hundreds of combatants on each side and were fought on two separate fronts
(north and south of Charleston). Furthermore, these battles were like
microcosms of the colonial landscape, defining relationships among the period’s
three major cultural groups – Europeans, Native Americans, and enslaved
Africans. Indeed, historical accounts of these battles are clear that almost half of
Carolina militia forces was comprised of enslaved Africans.
Pocotaligo and Yamasee Raids on Port Royal: April 15, 1715
At daybreak on this day, a colonial delegation from Charleston was brutally
tortured and murdered by Yamasees at the town of Pocotaligo near modern-day
Beaufort, SC. The scene is described in chilling detail by Charles Rodd, a

Charleston merchant, in a 1715 letter to his employers in London (Rodd 1928).
Describing the attack and torture of Indian agent Thomas Nairne writes, “But
next morning at dawn their terrible war-whoop was heard and a great multitude
was seen whose faces and several other parts of their bodies were painted with
red and black streaks, resembling devils come out of Hell… They threw
themselves first upon the Agents and on Mr. Wright, seized their houses and
effects, fired on everybody without distinction, and put to death, with torture, in
the most cruel manner in the world, those who escaped the fire of their
weapons… I do not know if Mr. Wright was burnt piece-meal, or not: but it is said
that the criminals loaded Mr. Nairne with a great number of pieces of wood, to
which they set fire, and burnt him in this manner so that he suffered horrible
torture, during several days, before he was allowed to die.” Rodd goes on to
describe the harrowing escape of families from their plantations around nearby
Port Royal as the Yamasees began their war.
The “Sadkeche Fight” and Carolina Counteroffensive against Yamasee Towns:
late April, 1715
South Carolina's military response to the Yamasee raids was swift. Only a week
after the murders at Pocotaligo, Governor Craven of South Carolina personally
led militia forces against the Yamasees in their own towns. He sent some of his
forces to attack Pocotaligo by water, while he mustered some 250 men to attack
overland. Part of this offensive is a battle now called “The Sadkeche Fight.” In
this engagement, Craven was ambushed in camp while on his march to
Pocotaligo somewhere on the Combahee River near Salkehatchie, SC. A weekly
broadside called The Boston Newsletter, reported on the battle stating, “The
Governour marched within Sixteen miles of [Pocotaligo], and encamped at night
in a large Savanna or Plain, by a Wood-side, and was early next morning by break
of day saluted with a volley of shot from about Five hundred of the enemy; that
lay ambuscaded in the Woods, who notwithstanding of the surprise, soon put his
men in order, and engaged them so gallantly three quarters of an hour, that he
soon routed the enemy; killed and wounded several of them; among whom
some of their chief Commanders fell” (June 6, 1715). Meanwhile, the Carolina
militia forces sent by water scored decisive victories against the Yamasee towns
near Beaufort, forcing those groups to retreat southward across the Altamaha
River in present-day Georgia.

had marched the Army to Zantee [sic], however he returned back on the first
notice upon his approach the Indians fled over Ponpon Bridge and burnt it having
killed 4 or 5 white men. We have not since heard from them.”
This incursion marked the last major engagement of the Yamasee War. In
August, much needed military supplies arrived in Charleston from Virginia and
New England. Also, the colonial assembly passed an act that funded a 1200 man
militia and the construction of ten substantial forts across the frontier. By
August, the Yamasee had also began their withdrawal south to Spanish territory
around the St. Augustine.
The Road to War
In order to understand the Yamasee War, one must be aware of the historical
context surrounding this conflict – the social, economic, and political landscape.
What did this colonial landscape look like to Yamasees and other Indian groups
or to Carolina settlers, traders, and officials? Many scholars agree that this
colonial landscape was largely shaped by two closely related historical forces –
European colonial competition and the trade in Indian slaves. Indeed, these were
the engines that drove the Yamasees and other Indian groups, on one side, and

Santee Raids and Captain Chicken’s Charge: mid May-early June 1715
To Carolina settlers, the scale and violence of the Yamasee attacks on Port
Royal must have been frightening. These fears, however, must have quickly
multiplied when news emerged that a second group of raids was taking place at
plantations along the Santee River north of Charleston. The fact that these raids
were conducted by the Catawba and Cherokee stoked rumors that these violent
assaults were part of a pan-Indian revolt aimed at driving Europeans from the
region.
The first attack occurred at the plantation of John Herne (Hyrne), near present
day Vance, SC. In his 1715 journal, Goose Creek missionary Francis LeJau says
the Indians “killed poor Herne Treacherously, after he had given them some
Victuals [food], according to Our usual friendly manner.” Following this attack,
the Indians ambushed a group of Carolina militia sent to the area to investigate.
Twenty-seven of the militia were killed in this engagement. The invading force
then moved on to a fortified plantation known as Schenkingh’s Cowpen – a site
now submerged under Lake Marion near Eadytown, SC. Here the group was able
to trick the commanding militia officer to let them inside the palisade under the
pretense of surrender. Once inside the defenses, the group pulled out their
weapons, slayed 22 militiamen, and burnt the garrison. It appears that the
raiding Indian force then began to move toward Goose Creek, which had largely
been deserted.
The culmination of engagements on the northern front happened on June 13,
when militia captain George Chicken led a force out to meet the advancing
Indian group. A letter from Charleston merchant Samuel Eveleigh (1715) gives
great detail of the battle stating, “Capt. Chicken march'd from the Ponds [near
Summerville, SC] with 120 men and understanding that they were got to a
Plantation about 4 miles distant marched thither, divided his men into three
parties, two of which he ordered to march in part to surround them, and in part
to prevent their flight into an adjacent swamp but before the said party could
arrive to the post designed them, two Indians belonging to the enemy scouting
down to the place where Captain Chicken lay in ambascade [sic] he was obliged
for fear of discovery to shoot them down, and immediatly fell upon the body,
routed them and as is supposed killed about 40 besides their wounded they
carried away.” This significant engagement, sometimes known as “The Battle of
the Ponds,” halted the advance of the piedmont Indians and marked their
withdrawal from the war (they sent a peace delegation to Virginia about a month
later). This battle thus effectively ended the war on the northern front.
Apalachee Raid on New London (Willtown) and the Burning of St. Paul’s
Parish: mid July 1715
A few weeks after Captain Chicken’s victory, Governor Craven marched with a
militia force of about 200 settlers, enslaved Africans, and allied Indians in order
to launch an offensive against the piedmont Indians who attacked the northern
plantations. Shortly after crossing the Santee River, Craven received word that a
large force of 500-700 Apalachee and allied groups had crossed over the Edisto
River and attacked the colonial settlement called New London, located on
present-day Willtown Bluff, SC. The garrison at New London prevented the force
from entering the town, so the raiding force set about attacking plantations
across St. Paul’s Parish all the way to the Stono River. The Indians managed to
retreat across the Edisto River and destroy the bridge before Craven’s militia
forces arrived. Once again, Samuel Eveleigh (1715) describes the action, “…the
Apalatchee and other Southern Indians came down on New London, and
destroy'd all the Plantations on the way, besides my Lady Blakes, Falls, Col.
Evans and several others, have also burnt Mr. Boon's plantations and the ship he
was building. The crops thank God are still pretty good; the Govr. at that instant
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the South Carolinian settlers, on the other, to their violent clash.
Colonial Competition
In 1663, King Charles II of England granted eight "promoter-politicians" a
patent for land to be set up as a proprietary colony called Carolina. A proprietary
colony was different from royal colonies like Virginia in that proprietary colonies
were first and foremost commercial ventures that served to increase the
fortunes of proprietors and colonists alike. The personal histories of some of the
wealthiest men in South Carolina during the period suggest that one could
amass a large fortune by combining the Indian trade for slaves and deerskins
with planting. Indeed, this economic structure, in which the profits from trading
were used to capitalize the growth of plantations with both funds and slave
labor, was in large part responsible for the rise of the Carolina colony within the
burgeoning trans-Atlantic economy (Gallay 2002; Nash 2001).
The economic and strategic ambitions associated with empire building
naturally generated strife among the fragile colonial beachheads of England,
Spain, and France. Whether they desired the position or not, by virtue of
geography South Carolina would be the English colonial vanguard against any
southeastern invasion from Spanish or French forces. To prepare for this threat,
the South Carolina proprietors implemented a proactive defensive strategy that
featured the use of allied Indian groups to create a "buffer zone" to protect the
colony from the Spanish and French and their Indian allies.
The buffer zone that was to protect South Carolina needed to be strongest to
the south in order to check raids by the Spanish and their Indian allies. To secure
this area, beginning in the 1680s, colonial officials set about encouraging allied
Indian groups to settle along the Savannah River with the construction of a
trading post at Savannah Town. Also during this period, the Yamasees, who
occupied a territory between St. Helena Island and land along the Ashepoo and
Combahee rivers, were courted intensively. Thomas Nairne (1710), the first
Indian agent of Carolina, boasted of the success of this strategy saying that "all
of the Indians within 700 miles of Charlestown" had been made "[English]
subjects...by drawing over to [the colony's] side or destroying.” During his
torture and eventual death at the outset of the Yamasee War, Nairne would
quite painfully learn that his boasting was premature.
It is clear that the South Carolina architects of this strategy never intended for
the buffer zone of Indian allies to be a passive deterrent to their European rivals.
From their earliest overtures to Indian groups, South Carolina officials intended
to create an armed militia of Indians that could be persuaded to promote the
colony's interests internally and abroad. The Tuscarora War is a good example of
this strategy. The war consisted of two military expeditions (in 1712 and 1713) led
by South Carolinians along with an assembled force of Yamasee, Apalachee,
Cherokee, and Catawba numbering in the hundreds. These expeditions defeated
the Tuscarora, which resulted in their forced emigration from North Carolina.
The period also witnessed the use of Indian allies, especially Yamasees, on a
much larger scale in major colonist-led Indian military forays against European
rivals that cumulatively resulted in the deaths and enslavement of thousands
Indians. These forays included Colonel James Moore's invasions of Spanish
Florida as part of Queen Anne's War, first against St. Augustine in 1702, and later
against the Apalachee missions in 1704. These operations, which resulted in the
destruction of the Spanish-allied Apalachee Indians, included 370 Yamasee
Indians and 1,000 Muskogee-speaking Indians respectively.

Indian Slave Trade
Until relatively recently, research regarding the trade in Indian slaves has been
relegated to isolated anecdotes in the history and archaeology of the
seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Southeast. Historians William
Ramsey and Alan Gallay have done much to quantify the scale of Indian slavery
by consulting the colonial records of South Carolina. Ramsey (2001) sketched the
demography of Indian slavery in South Carolina during the period. By the
outbreak of the Yamasee War in 1715, he found that approximately 25% of all
slaves held by South Carolinians were Indians. Ramsey (2003) pointed to strong
market forces in influencing the scale of slave trade during the English Contact
Period arguing that the South Carolina economy depended on slave labor not
only for working South Carolina's plantations, but also for trade to other
plantation colonies.
Gallay's research furthered the argument that most Indian slaves sold in
Charleston markets were later traded to other colonies. He asserted that the
population estimated by Ramsey was but a small fraction of the total number of
slaves taken during this period. Based on transport records following major
military campaigns (described above) and trader accounts, Gallay (2002)
estimated the total number of Indian slaves that were taken between 1670 and
1715 to be between 24,000 and 51,000 individuals. He believed that a large
percentage of the trade in Indian slaves was purposefully left undocumented in
order to keep secret "an important commodity that was regulated and taxed by
the mother country when obtained from Africa."
The demand for slave labor in colonial plantation economies was thus a major
determinant of the early eighteenth-century trading system, but the supply-side
of the slavery system must also be considered. Most researchers agree that the
taking of slaves by southeastern Indians was a tradition of significant geographic
range and time-depth (Martin 1994). While early southeastern slave-taking
tradition was an occasional practice whose purpose was to augment the ranks of
diminished local populations or to attain war captives, however, slave-taking in
the three decades leading to the Yamasee War became a profit-driven
"commercial" venture. A single slave might fetch as much as 200 skins for an
Indian captor; therefore, taking even a few slaves in one raid could provide a
hunter with more skins than he could usually procure in an entire hunting season
(Ramsey 2001).
Historical accounts also indicate that English traders often incited Indian
groups to conduct slave raids. Dr. Francis Le Jau, a missionary living near
Charleston, expressed a distaste for this practice in his journal writing, "It is
reported that some of our Inhabitants...excite them [Indians] to make War
amongst themselves to get Slaves which they give for our European goods" and
"some white men living or trading among them do foment and increase that
Bloody Inclination in order to get slaves" (Le Jau 1708, 1713). Le Jau also provided
a plausible explanation for Indian participation in slave raiding stating that in
some cases it became the only viable option for paying off astronomical debts
accumulated with English traders. While extending lines of credit was often
necessary given the seasonal nature of deer hunting, in more than a few cases
the European traders employed predatory schemes that resulted in Indians
amassing exorbitant debts. The most extreme example of this situation was the
Yamasee, who by 1711 had accumulated a debt of 100,000 skins – roughly twice
the annual average of all deerskin exports from South Carolina (Haan 1981).
Whether to fulfill desire or necessity, the promise of wealth attained through
capturing slaves led to the widespread participation of Indian groups in South
Carolina's military campaigns in Queen Anne's War early during the eighteenth
century. This new type of commercial slavery led to the meteoric rise (and fall) of
so-called "militaristic slaving societies," like the Yamasee, whose sole focus (at
least from the perspective of colonial records) was "making war" and controlling
access to English trade (Bowne 2005; Ethridge 2010). These heavily armed
groups, which included most infamously the Yamasee, but also the Westo,
Yuchi, Chickasaw, and Savannah (Shawnee), were the major regional players in a
European-backed interregional slave trading system that preyed upon Indian
towns stretching from the Carolina and Georgia Piedmont, across the
Appalachian Mountains, to the lower Mississippi valley.
Was there a “cause” for the war?
Until very recently, the history of the years leading up to the Yamasee War has
been presented as a singular story. Originally put forth in the 1920s by the
venerable historian Verner W. Crane (2004) and the equally esteemed
anthropologist John R. Swanton (1998), this narrative presents a relatively
straightforward picture of the Yamasee War as a "far reaching revolt" of
numerous southeastern tribes spurred on by indebtedness to and mistreatment
at the hands of Carolinian. This classic explanation has been challenged recently
with a series of historical and ethnohistorical works. The authors of these works
argue that the established explanation for the Yamasee War is overly simplistic.
(e.g., Gallay 2002; Martin 1994; Oatis 2004; Ramsey 2001).

In the place of a singular process (i.e., The cause of the war), these authors
characterize the Yamasee War as the outcome of a complex mix of strategies
and events that were enacted and experienced differently by the various
participants. Instead of lumping all Indian groups into the singular role of
reactionaries against the English traders, the authors of these works explore the
varied strategies pursued by Indian groups as they interacted with other Indian
groups, colonial traders, and colonial governments.
To various extents, the authors of recent works agree that while some of the
Indian participants were in collusion, the Yamasee War was not a pan-Indian
conspiracy carried out with the aid of a master plan. Instead, they hold that each
group acted according to their own strategy and toward their own diplomatic
goals. Abuse by traders, mounting debts, and the fear of enslavement were
important factors in some groups' decisions to join the war against South
Carolina, but these three causes were far from universal. These causes apply

most to the Yamasee, but even their decision to attack South Carolina
settlements was also likely influenced by the encroachment of Europeans on
their treaty-protected lands as well as a breakdown in diplomacy with colonial
officials. Indeed, Ramsey (2001) has argued that while abusive behavior by
traders was present in accounts from the period leading up to the Yamasee War,
the accounts spoke of multiple causes for tension with the Yamasee including
violence against women, credit problems, and trade in slaves. He further argued
that these tensions were imbedded in the very nature of the trade itself, with the
English traders, colonial officials, and Indian groups all struggling to satisfy the
huge demand for labor (slaves) and deerskins in the colonial plantation and
Atlantic economies.
For Muskogean, Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw groups, there was no
possibility of English settler encroachment during this period, and these groups
were far too strong to fear an immediate invasion by English forces. With this in
mind, Gallay interprets the killing of English traders in these groups' towns as a
diplomatic message sent to the Carolina officials – the gist of the message being,
"English promises for reform were no longer acceptable. Alliance was no longer
appropriate or possible...[The Indians were] announcing to the English the need
to negotiate a new relationship (Gallay 2002).
The Aftermath
While major military operations ended within the first two months of the war,
Yamasee and Muskogean raids on trading caravans and frontier skirmishes with
South Carolina militia continued sporadically for the next two years. As the
confusion of the first violent weeks of the war settled down, it was obvious that
the social, political, and economic landscape of the Southeast had changed
dramatically and that Indian groups and colonial officials would have to
renegotiate their diplomatic and trading relationships. For South Carolinians, in
a matter of weeks the landscape had transformed from one of security,
surrounded by a protective "buffer zone" of Indian allies, to one of utter
vulnerability. As for the instigators of the war, only weeks after their first
successful raids, the Yamasee had lost a quarter of their number to death or
slavery, and they were forced to move their towns south to seek protection from
the Spanish. While not creating as perilous a situation as that experienced by the
Yamasee, the chaos of war caused a temporary but crucial breach in the
fundamental diplomatic and trading relationships among all southeastern Indian
groups and South Carolina. In doing so, the war created a moment when
everything was "on the table" and negotiable. Consequently, the twenty-five
year period following the war (ca. 1715-1740) included significant changes in
diplomacy and trade that reflected the attempts of all groups to adjust to this
new post-war landscape.
In rebuilding diplomatic relations with Indian groups after the Yamasee War,
South Carolina officials sought to avoid another disaster by making diplomatic
relations with Indian groups as streamlined as possible. In order to do this, the
government attempted to reduce the number of Indian entities with whom the
colony negotiated by lumping politically independent Indian towns into
composite groups called "nations" and assigning a single individual to speak for
the entire group (Oatis 2004). It was likely the convergence of South Carolina's
nationalizing strategy with the Indians' natural consolidation due to population
loss that resulted in the emergence of geographically bounded ethnic
collectivities we now refer to as "Creek," "Cherokee," and "Catawba" (Knight
1994; Marcoux 2010; Merrell 1989).
The Yamasee War also brought about the cessation of the trade in Indian
slaves. The precipitous decline likely came about as a result of decreases in both
supply and demand. If Peter Wood's (1989) demographic estimates for the
previous period (ca. 1685-1715) are to be believed, then the combination of slave
raids and disease reduced the southeastern Indian population by half in 1715.
When population losses at this scale combined with the accelerating rate of
consolidation among surviving populations, the result was that the supply of
potential slaves effectively dried up.
In regard to the demand for Indian slaves, the Yamasee War introduced South
Carolinians to the real threat of Indian attacks on the colony. The war also
brought to light the fact that when conflicts with Indians arose, there would be a
large population of Indian slaves among the colonists that could easily turn on
their masters. These fears likely influenced South Carolina planters to begin
shifting their slave labor pool from Indians to Africans. The shift in preference to
African slaves may also have been due to their long tenure as plantation labor in
the Caribbean and the planter's belief that African slaves were more resistant to
European disease (Martin 1994). Whatever the reason for this shift in demand,
the result was a drastic and permanent decrease in the number Indian slaves
owned by South Carolina households. In a survey of South Carolina will
transcripts, for example, Ramsey (2001) found that household ownership of
Indian slaves declined from 26% in 1714 to just 2% by 1730.
The Yamasee resided in South Carolina for only 30 years after fleeing north
from the Spanish missions. They were major players in the colonial history of
South Carolina, but the Yamasee War led to their return to Spanish Florida. In
subsequent years, South Carolina forces repeatedly attacked those Yamasee
who settled near St. Augustine, and the Yamasee raided plantations in South
Carolina from time to time. Yamasee lands in South Carolina were given to
Carolina settlers, and the towns where the Yamasee had once resided fell into
disuse and ultimately disappeared. The only indication that the Yamasee ever
resided on the lower South Carolina coast is found in the rivers and creeks
named after them—Okatie, Chechesee, Pocotaligo, Huspah.
REFERENCES
References used in the completion of this article, as well as digital copies of this
poster are available online at
http://www.artsandsciences.sc.edu/sciaa/archaeology-month-2015

This poster was designed by Lisa R. Hudgins and Dr. Chester DePratter of the Research Division at the South Carolina Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology for South Carolina Archaeology Month 2015. The activity that is the subject of this poster has been financed, in part, with Federal funds from the National Park Service, U. S. Department of the Interior, and administered by the South Carolina Department of Archives and History. However, the contents and opinions do not necessarily
reflect the views or policies of the Department of the Interior, nor does the mention of trade names or commercial products constitute endorsement or recommendations by the Department of the Interior. Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, The U. S. Department of the Interior prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, or handicap in its federally assisted programs. If you believe you have been discriminated
against in any program, activity, or facility as described above, or if you desire further information, please write to: Office of Equal Opportunity, U.S. Department of the Interior Washington, DC 20240. In addition to the above, the consultant agrees to comply with the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. 6 101 Et. Seq,, which prohibits discrimination in hiring on the basis of age.

